Al Qaeda vs. AQAP: A Visual Analysis

In addition to our regular collection and coding of worldwide violent extremist events, ISVG analysts often use open source data to explore the organizational connections within and between terrorist organizations.  Here, analyst Rick Kania uses i2 Analyst’s Notebook to demonstrate the organizational structure and ties between Afghanistan/Pakistan-based Al Qaeda Central (AQC) and Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP).

The following chart depicts the organizational structure of AQC and AQAP.  Open-source information indicates that while the United States and its allies have been highly effective at killing or capturing high-level members of AQC, the central leadership of AQAP remains largely intact—Yemeni counterparts have experienced only limited success targeting AQAP, with most of its kills or captures consisting of mid-level regional AQAP commanders.

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Leadership Summary:

In January 2009, Saudi-based AQAP announced its merger with Al Qaeda in Yemen and moved its base of operations to Yemen.  Nasser Al Wahishi, member of the now absorbed Al Qaeda in Yemen, became the group’s Emir.

Currently, seven of the nine members that make up AQAP’s central leadership have ties to AQC.  Al Wahishi served as Osama Bin Laden’s personal secretary in the 1990s[1] and was rumored to be a possible successor to Bin Laden,[2] though longtime deputy Ayman Al Zawahiri has since taken over as Emir of AQC.

Senior operations commander Fahd Al Quso was involved the October 2000 attack on the USS Cole and has been identified as a financier of the 9/11 attacks.[3] Mohammad Al Awfi, former AQAP field commander, was involved with the Al Qaeda-linked Jammat Al Tablighi and Wafa Humanitarian Organization and trained at Al Qaeda’s Al Farouq camp in Afghanistan; he fought with Al Qaeda and the Taliban at Tora Bora in late 2001[4] (Al Awfi has since denounced terrorism and turned himself into Saudi authorities).

Othman Al Ghamdi, who was recently designated as a terrorist by the United States State Department for his role as a senior AQAP commander, trained with Al Qaeda at Al Farouq camp just after 9/11 and was arrested along the Afghanistan/Pakistan border by Pakistani police in late 2001.[5] Saeed Al Shehri, the deputy Emir of AQAP, helped finance Al Qaeda after 9/11, trained at an Al Qaeda camp near Kabul and helped facilitate the entry of fighters from Iran into Afghanistan.[6] Ibrahim Al Rubaish, currently the chief theologian of AQAP, trained at Al Qaeda’s Al Farouq camp and was with Al Qaeda militants at Tora Bora at the time on the American invasion in late 2001.[7]